This paper is self-contained. It will not require a knowledge of our earlier results.
Introduction
This paper addresses an open question raised by Paris and Wilkie in 1981 [23] . It is well known that Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem [12] asserts that neither Peano Arithmetic nor any consistent extension of it can prove a theorem affirming its own consistency under Hilbert deduction. There have been numerous generalizations and extensions of Gödel's seminal result [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 14, 19, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44] .
For example, the combined work of Pudlák and Solovay [25, 30] has shown that essentially no axiom system that recognizes Successor(x) = x + 1 as a total function can prove a theorem affirming its own consistency under Hilbert deduction.
In 1981, Paris and Wilkie [23] asked whether the axiom system IΣ 0 , often also called I∆ 0 , did satisfy the Second Incompleteness Theorem for cut-free methods of deduction, such as Semantic Tableaux. Interestingly, Wilkie-Paris [37] discovered IΣ 0 +Exp is unable to prove the Hilbert consistency of the axiom system Q. Thus, the Paris-Wilkie open question pertains essentially to Semantic Tableaux and Herbrand deduction.
We will use a convention where a formula is called ∆ 0 iff all its quantifiers are bounded quantifiers in the language of arithmetic (i.e. the quantifiers " ∀ v ≤ T " and " ∃ v ≤ T " use terms T that are built with only the addition and multiplication function symbols).
A formula will be called Π 1 iff it can be written as ∀ v 1 ∀ v 2 ... ∀ v n φ(v 1 , v 2 , ...v n ) where φ(v 1 , v 2 , ...v n ) is a ∆ 0 formula.
Let us next recall that Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [33] defined Q to be a very weak axiom system that defined addition and multiplication to be total functions but contained no induction principle or much other useful information about addition and multiplication.
There are two natural ways for defining the IΣ 0 axiom system. It can be defined as using either Equations (1) or (2)'s limited induction scheme for ∆ 0 formulae, combined with the Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson [33] axiom system, called Q. 
Both ∆ 0 induction schemes are known to produce an identical set of theorems when they are combined with Q's axioms. In essence, the first induction scheme appeared in the logic textbooks by Hájek-Pudlák [13] , Kaye [15] and Krajícek [18] . Equation (2)'s alternate IΣ 0 induction scheme was used in the Wilkie-Paris article [37] . We will henceforth use the terms Type-1 and Type-2 to describe these two induction schemes for IΣ 0 .
An initial effort to answer the 1981 Paris-Wilkie open question [23] about whether IΣ 0 would satisfy the Second Incompleteness Theorem for cut-free deduction such as Semantic Tableaux and Herbrand deduction, was undertaken by Adamowicz and Zbierski [1, 4] . They presented a positive solution to the Paris-Wilkie open question [23] for the axiom system IΣ 0 +Ω 1 . Willard [38, 40] subsequently strengthened their result to show that the Type-1 induction scheme for It pointed out the formal difference between the Type-1 and Type-2 induction schemes for IΣ 0 and asked whether it would be possible to generalize [40] 's results to IΣ 0 's Type-2 induction scheme?
A simple answer to Ko lodziejczyk's question is that the basic incompleteness results from [40] will generalize for IΣ 0 's Type-2 induction scheme. However, a full answer to Ko lodziejczyk's fascinating question is somewhat more complicated because our research has also discovered a third class of axiomizations for IΣ 0 , called Ax-3 in our companion paper [45] , that proves the same set of theorems as its Type-1 and Type-2 axiomizations but which is an anti-threshold for at least the Herbandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (The formal definition of an "anti-threshold" for the Second Incompleteness is provided in footnote 1 .)
The intuitive reason that Ax-3 will prove the same set of theorems as the Type-1 and Type-2 formalizations of IΣ 0 -while possessing an essentially opposite incompleteness propertyis that these three systems will be unable to formally recognize that they prove the same set of theorems (although they actually do generate identical sets of theorems).
This unexpected contrast high-lights the importance of the open question that Paris-Wilkie posed in their initial 1981 paper [23] and which Leszek Ko lodziejczyk (after having conversations with Zofia Adamowicz and Konrad Zdanowksi in Warsaw) essentially reformulated in his November 16, 2005 email to us. It is that the axiom system IΣ 0 so closely straddles the border between the feasible and infeasible that different logically equivalent versions of it will surprisingly support essentially opposing incompleteness properties ! Our discussion of this topic has been divided into two separate parts. Under this division, our companion paper [45] explores some unorthodox-but-valid axiomizations of IΣ 0 that should be viewed as boundary-case exceptions for at least Herbrandized version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. In contrast, the current article focuses instead on generalizations of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for the Type-1 and Type-2 versions of IΣ 0 .
Our research has discovered two slightly different methods available for showing that the Type-2 version of IΣ 0 has similar incompleteness properties as its Type-1 version. One is a revision of the proof techniques that had appeared in our earlier paper [40] . (We will sketch the structure of this technique later in Appendix C.) An alternate method, which is simpler, 1 In a context where D is a deduction method, an axiom system α will be called an "anti-threshold" of the Second Incompleteness Theorem relative to D iff there exists a consistent axiom system α * that contains all α 's formal axioms and which can prove the following statement:
"There exists no proof of 0 = 1 when the deduction method D is applied to the axiom system α * ."
One reason this "anti-threshold" construct is useful is that it signals that a conventional Gódel-like diagonalization proof cannot be applied to analyze the properties of either α or α * (because the latter's ability to prove the above quoted statement shows that a conventional diagonalization proof must certainly be infeasible.) uses a new technique, called Passive Induction. It did not appear in [40] . It also allows one to simultaneously prove that both the Type-1 and Type-2 versions of IΣ 0 satisfy the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. It will be the focus of the current paper.
Passive Induction is likely to be viewed as an interesting technique unto itself, quite apart from quite apart from its relevance to the 25- 
Notation and Structural Remarks
Our formal definition of a semantic tableaux proof is similar to that appearing in Fitting's and Smullyan's textbooks [11, 29] . It is given below in Definition 1. (For the sake of simplifying our presentation, this definition views the bounded quantifier " ∀v ≤ s " as a syntactic object different from the unbounded quantifier of " ∀v ". It likewise separates bounded existential quantifier " ∃v ≤ s " from the unbounded existential quantifier " ∃v ".) Definition 1 . A Semantic Tableaux Proof of a theorem Φ will consist of a tree whose root is the sentence ¬ Φ and whose all other nodes are either axioms of α or deductions from higher nodes in the proof-tree. Let the notation " A −→ B " indicate that B is a valid deduction when A is an ancestor of B in the proof-tree T . In this notation, the deduction rules allowed under our definition of Semantic Tableaux are: 3. The pair of sibling nodes Θ and Γ may appear in a candidate tree whenever Θ ∨ Γ is their common ancestor. 4 . Similarly, a pair of sibling nodes ¬Θ and Γ may appear a candidate tree when Θ ⇒ Γ is their common ancestor.
5. ∃v Θ(v) −→ Θ(U ) where U denotes a newly introduced pseudo-constant symbol (often also called in literature a newly introduced "parameter symbol"), 6 . For any term s, the Rule 5's analog for bounded existential quantifiers is
where U again denotes a newly introduced parameter symbol.
7. ∀v Θ(v) −→ Θ(t) where t denotes a term free in Θ.
8. For any term s, the analog of Rule 7 for bounded universal quantifiers is:
where t again denotes a term free in Θ.
Define a particular leaf-to-root branch in a candidate tree T to be Closed iff it contains both some sentence Λ and its negation ¬ Λ . Then following Smullyan's convention [11, 29] , a Semantic Tableaux proof of Φ is defined to be a tree whose root stores the sentence ¬Φ and whose every root-to-leaf branch is closed.
More Notation: Let SemPrf α (x, y) denote a ∆ 0 formula indicating that y is a semantic tableaux proof of the theorem x from the axiom system α . Given a sequence of integers
..i m , we will say a ∆ 0 formula Φ(g, j, x) makes g an encoding of this sequence iff Φ(g, j, x) is satisfied only when x represents the j−th element in the sequence i 1 , i 2 , i 3 , ...i m .
We will say g is a Linear Compressed Encoding of this sequence if Log(g) has a magnitude proportional to the size of m j=1 Log(i j + 2) . Buss, Hájek, Paris, Pudlák and Wilkie [8, 13, 37] have all given examples of such ∆ 0 encodings, and we will therefore not also do so here. The Linear Compressed Encodings are considered to be the most efficient possible method to do a formal Gödel encoding of a sentence or of a proof. We will therefore focus on studying such encodings in this paper. (It is probably unnecessary for a reader to examine our formal convention for generating Godel numbers, but a 1-page description of it is available in Appendix A.)
The symbol ⊥ will denote the Gödel number of the sentence 0 = 1 . The weakest possible definition of α's Semantic Tableaux Consistency is the following assertion:
The Definition 2 (below) will offer a different definition of a semantic tableaux deduction and therefore (implicitly) also a different notion of semantic tableaux consistency. Our main interest will be, of course, to derive a final result about semantic tableaux consistency using Equation (3)'s formalization of consistency, rather than to employ the more artificial construct that is implied by the Definition 2 (below). However, one nice aspect of Definition 2's construct is that it is a useful intermediate step for analyzing Equation (3)'s notion of semantic tableaux consistency.
Definition 2 . Let Log(x) denote Base-2 Logarithm, with downwards rounding to the lowest
where there are k iterations of logarithm. For any fixed constant K > 1 , the symbol SemPrf K α ( x , y , z ) will denote a ∆ 0 formula indicating that SemPrf α ( x , y) is valid AND that y ≤ Log( z , K ) . Often in this paper when K is a fixed constant, we will use the notation y ≤ Log K ( z ) as an abbreviation for y ≤ Log( z , K ) .
Remark 1 (concerning Definition 2's notation).
It was observed in Benett's Ph. D.
dissertation that the graph of exponentiation has a ∆ 0 encoding [6] . Expanding upon Benett's idea, Lemma 3.1 of [40] has observed how to formally encode the graphs of Log(x, k) and hence SemPrf K α (x, y, z) as ∆ 0 formulae. Moreover for a fixed constant K, let us say an integer y is K−small iff it satisfies the condition
Many articles in the prior literature [1, 4, 9, 16, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44] Subst(g, h) = The integer g is an encoding of a formula, and h encodes a sentence identical to g, except that all free variables in g are replaced with a mathematical term representing the numeric quantity of g.
Then D K (α) can be defined as being the Π 1 sentence Γ(N ) , where Γ(g) denotes the formula (5) andN denotes Γ(g)'s Gödel number.
The sentence D K (α) defined above will be henceforth called a Generalized Godel Diagonalization Sentence. Thus in a context, whereN denotes (5)'s Gödel number, the formal mathematical definition of D K (α) is:
In essence, our version of a proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in this paper (and in its earlier version [40] ) are similar to the classic diagonalization proofs, except that many intermediate steps will use D K (α) instead of D(α) . One would first naturally suspect that there must be some serious penalty for letting the unconventional diagonalizing sentence
However, it will turn out that there is no serious disadvantage for this change because it is only our intermediate steps (rather than our final theorems) that will be affected by this change. We need now to mention one theorem from our earlier paper [40] before we turn to our new results:
Theorem 1 Suppose α is an extension of Q which (for some standard number K ) proves the three theorems below. Then α is inconsistent.
A roughly 1-page formal proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Section 2 of our earlier paper [40] (under the heading of "Theorem 2.3"). There is no point to repeating that proof here.
(It is actually the only theorem that we will be using from our earlier work. The remainder of our discussion in this paper will be new, different, mostly stronger and significantly simpler.)
Our formal proof in the next section will actually not use Theorem 1 directly. Instead, it will employ a minor variant of it, which is formalized by Theorem 2. This theorem's statement will actually be the same as the prior statement of Theorem 1 except that it introduces a new constant of M into the formalism and replaces the old Condition-C of Theorem 1 with a new condition C*.
Theorem 2 Suppose α is an extension of Q where for two fixed integers from the standard model of the natural numbers called K and M, the axiom system α can proves the three theorems below. Then α is inconsistent.
The next paragraph will show that Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply that α can also prove the statements A, B and C from Theorem 1's hypothesis. However, the latter is impossible because Assumption (i) indicates that α is consistent, and Theorem 1 indicates that no consistent α can prove all of statements A, B and C. Using this reasoning, our proof-bycontradiction will establish that it is impossible to construct a system that violates Theorem 2's hypothesis.
More precisely, we need to show that (i) and (ii) imply that α can prove the statement C from Theorem 1's hypothesis. The footnote 2 demonstrates that Item (i) implies that the following statement must be valid in the standard model of the natural numbers:
Moreover, Equation (7) 
In turn, this fact implies that Q can prove prove the Statement C from Theorem 1's hypothesis (because the latter is a consequence of the combination of C* and Equations (7) and (8) in [40] . 2 The point is that Item (i) indicates that α is consistent, and no consistent α can be associated with an ordered pair (y, M ) that proves the sentence D K (α) because it would then prove the diagonalization sentence that states "There is no ordered pair (y, M ) that proves me". Thus Equation (7) must be certainly valid. 3 The point is that by definition, SemPrf
, y, z ) implies the validity of SemPrf α ( D K (α) , y, ), which turn implies the validity of SemPrf
Before describing Passive Induction, it is helpful to introduce some further notation. There are essentially three different natural definitions of the Tarski-Mostowski-Robinson, axiom system called Q [33] . The symbol Q 0 will denote the version of Q, used in the current paper.
It is is formalized by the Π 1 sentences in Equations (9) - (16) .
∀x ∀y
∀x ∀y ∀z
Also, let Q 1 denote a system that is begotten by taking the union of Q 0 with Equation (17)'s axiom (which declares that multiplication is a total function). Similarly, Q 2 will denote the union of Q 0 with the Equations (17) and (18) (that indicate multiplication and squaring are total functions).
∀x ∀y ∃z x * y = z (17)
It is apparent that all three of these definitions of Q can prove the same set of theorems (since the presence of a multiplication symbol in Equations (9) - (16) assures that Q 0 can prove the validity of the statements that multiplication and squaring are total functionseven if they are not formally incorporated as axioms). Thus, the only difference between Q 0 , Q 1 and Q 2 are the lengths of the proofs they generate (rather than the final theorems that they produce).
Also for i = 1 or 2 and j = 0, 1 or 2, let Type-i-j denote a form of the axiom system IΣ 0 that combines the Type−i version of IΣ 0 's induction scheme with the Q j version of the axiom system Q. Our semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem in the current article will actually apply to all six of the axiom systems of Type-1-0, Type-1-1, Type-1-2, Type-2-0, Type-2-1 and Type-2-2. However before starting our discussion, it is useful to address a question some logicians have asked us concerning which precise versions of IΣ 0 did the prior results of [40] actually pertain to?
The brief answer is that [40] Appendix C (which presupposes that the reader has already examined our earlier article [40] ) summarizes how [40] 's formalism can be adjusted to verify the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem for each of the Types 2-0, 2-1 and 2-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 without the use of the passive induction technique introduced in the current article.
Both the Appendices B and C are likely to be difficult to peruse quickly if the reader has not already examined our previous paper [40] in considerable detail. They are not vital for an understanding of the current article because its formalisms will be both self-contained and easier to understand (on account of the new concept of passive induction).
Also as the reader examines the remainder of this article, it should be kept in mind that some unorthodox-but-valid axiomizations of IΣ 0 (formalized in our companion article [45] ) are opposite incompleteness property -is that these systems will be unable to formally recognize that they prove the same set of theorems -although they actually do generate identical sets of theorems.)
Passive Induction
A ∆ 0 formula will be called Passive iff it includes no free variables. For example, if we write a formula using the formal notation convention of " φ(x, y) " but there are actually no free occurrences of x or y or any other variable in φ's body, then we will call this formula "passive". Obviously, if " φ(x, y) " is passive then there is no strong reason why it was necessary to use the variable names "x" and "y" to designate this formula's namesince it could be more tersely denoted as " φ ". However from a strictly legalistic mathematical perspective, " φ(x, y) " is a legitimate although perhaps redundant name for this formula.
Let us now apply this concept to the main induction formulae that are used by the axiom system IΣ 0 . These two ∆ 0 induction schemes were defined by the Equations (1) and (2) of Section 1, and they are rewritten below. They are called the Type-1 and Type-2 inductive schemes for IΣ 0 . Both schemes prove the same set of theorems when they are combined with Q's axiom system.
Using the nomenclature from the preceding two paragraphs, the induction formulae in
Equations (19) and (20) will be called Passive when their ∆ 0 base formula φ(x, y) is passive. Although this notation is certainly well defined, many readers will initially feel somewhat uncomfortable with "Passive Induction". This is because it would initially appear that the meaning of Equations (19) and (20) is quite diluted when they discuss a formula φ that has no active free variables of x and y. In other words, the following question will naturally arise in the minds of most meticulous logicians: * What is the meaning of Equations (19) and (20) The answer to the preceding question is oddly both "yes" and "no" -depending on which kind of deduction methodology one is applying. The "no" half of * 's answer concerns Hilbert deduction, where a passive induction sentence clearly adds no more useful information than a tautology (that technically contains no formally functional information). On the other hand, if one uses a cut-free method of deduction, such as semantic tableaux, Herbrand deduction or the cut-free predicate form of the sequent calculus (which Takeuti [31] has called " LKprovability"), then it will turn out that even the passive form of Equations (19) and (20)'s axioms can cause a theorem's formal proof to have its length drop in size by an exponential or greater magnitude! It will be on account of this change in proof length that we are able to reply to Ko lodziejczyk's emailed questions with a positive answer that our IΣ 0 Incompleteness Theorem will generalize for the Type-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 .
To appreciate the nature of this formalism, let α now denote an initial axiom system, and α * denote a second formalism that includes all α 's axioms plus for every sentence Ψ an added axiom of the form:
From either Godel's Completeness Theorem or Gentzen's Cut Elimination Theorem, it is well known that α and α * prove the same set of theorems. However, it is also well known that proofs under α * can be super-exponentially shorter than proofs from α under Semantic
Tableaux and Herbrand deduction. This is because Equation (21)'s schema allows α * to essentially simulate a Gentzen-style cut rule. It is well known that this causes Semantic
Tableaux proofs from α * to have essentially lengths comparable to proofs from α using Hilbert deduction.
The remainder of this article will observe that the passive forms of the induction formulae in Equations (19) and (20) have essentially the same property as the also-redundant axiom in Equation (21) . That is, neither will broaden the set of theorems that can be proven. However, passive uses of the induction axioms can exponentially shorten the lengths of cut-free tableauxlike proofs, in a manner that is completely analogous to Equation (21)'s well-known shortening effect for proof lengths.
As a result of this shortening effect, we will derive a simpler proof of the IΣ 0 incompleteness theorem than had appeared in our previous article. Also, our new result will apply to both the Type-1 and Type-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 , unlike [40] 's formalism which applied only to the former. i. Any axiom system α that contains Equation (21)
ii. Both the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 .
iii. Any extension of the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 .
Proof of Assertion (i) :
The validity of Assertion (i) is well known. However, we will review Assertion (i)'s proof because Assertion (ii)'s proof will rest on a more complicated version of the same methodology.
We begin by recalling that Definition 1 indicated that the root of a semantic tableaux proof of the theorem Γ must store the sentence ¬ Γ in the tree's root. Also for any ∆ 0 formula Ψ, the sentence ¬Ψ ∨ ¬ ¬ Ψ is a formal axiom of α under hypothesis (i). Thus, we may insert this axiom directly below the root in our proof tree. Then using Definition 1's Rule 3
(for ∨ elimination), we may insert the following two sibling nodes below this node:
Let S 1 denote a closed subtree descending from Equation (22): We will make its formal structure simply simulate the proof of Ψ . Moreover, since Equation (23) stores the sentence ¬ ¬ Ψ and the root (above it) stores ¬ Γ , we may hang a subtree S 2 descending from Equation (23) , that resembles the proof of Ψ ⇒ Γ . Hence since G and L denotes the lengths of these two proofs (according to Definition 5's terminology), it follows that Γ 's proof
Proof of Part (ii) :
The analysis of both the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 are similar. We will therefore focus on the latter for simplicity.
Below is written an instance of Equation (20)'s induction axiom where ¬ Ψ replaces the generic symbol " φ(x, y) ". (Here ¬ Ψ is a passive formula because it has no free variables):
Definition 1 had indicated that the root of a semantic tableaux proof of the theorem Γ will store the sentence ¬ Γ. Since an axiom can be inserted anywhere in a semantic tableaux proof, we will make Equation (24)'s sentence the root's child. The next two nodes in our semantic tableaux proof will consist of straight-line path consisting of two applications of Definition 1's ∀ Elimination Rule. These applications will eliminate both x and z's universal quantifiers in Equation (24) and replace both these variables with the constant of "1". The resulting great grandchild of the root will then be
Next we apply Definition 1's ⇒ Elimination rule to the node (25) and thus derive via Definition 1's Rule 4 the following pair of sibling nodes:
There are eight additional reduction steps, and we will omit itemizing them for the sake of brevity. At the end of these eight steps, our proof tree will be split into four branches (with the terminating nodes A and B descending from Equation (26) and with C and D descending from Equation (27) ).
The nice aspect of this semantic tableaux proof is that the branches descending from nodes A and D terminate promptly because they are inherently contradictory (see the footnote 5 for a clarification). On the other hand, the nodes B and C store the same sentences as the nodes in Part (i)'s proof that stored the contents of Equations (22) and (23). Thus we may end Part
(ii)'s proof in the same manner as we had ended Part (i)'s simpler proof.
In particular, we shall insert a copy of Ψ's proof below node C (because it stores "¬ Ψ") and a copy of the proof of Ψ ⇒ Γ below node B (because node B stores " ¬ ¬ Ψ" and the 4 The quantity "0" is selected when applying Definition 1's Rule 8 (for eliminating the "Bounded ∀ " quantifiers) to Equation (27) 's sentence. This rule allows one to choose any term one desires for " t ", including a term (such as "0" ) that forces a quick contradiction, which pleasantly shortens the length of our semantic tableaux proof). In particular, the application of Rule 8 to Equation (27) 's sentence will produce the deduction of " 0 ≤ 1 ⇒ ¬ Ψ ". In turn, an application of the ⇒ elimination rule to this last sentence will produce a branch in the proof-tree yielding the two sibling nodes stored in Items C and D.
5 By "terminate promptly" in the footnoted paragraph, it is meant that the proofs descending from nodes A and D have lengths that are unrelated and independent of the quantities L and G , which Definition 5 had indicated were the length of the proofs for the sentences of Ψ and of Ψ → Γ. Thus when we wish to calculate the length of Γ 's proof as a function of L and G , it is the nodes B and C (rather than A and D) whose subtrees have proof-lengths related to L and G . tree's root had stored " ¬ Γ " ). Hence using Definition 5's terminology, where G and L are the lengths of the proofs for Ψ and for Ψ ⇒ Γ , we obtain that Γ 's proof will have an
Proof of Part (iii) : Essentially the same as Part (ii)'s proof. 2 Definition 6 . For arbitrary n, the symbol Υ n will denote the following ∆ 0 sentence that uses O(n) symbols and asserts the existence of an integer v n that equals 2 2 n .
Lemma 2 There exists a constant d such that the sentence Υ n has a length O( n d ) proof from either the T-1 or T-2 axiomization for IΣ 0 .
Proof Sketch. Let Φ 0 denote another way of writing the sentence Υ 0 , and let Φ i be defined below:
Then Appendix D will offer a quite routine proof of the following statement ( + ) For some fixed constant c, the sentence Φ i will have a proof with an O( i c ) length from either the T-1 or T-2 axiomization for IΣ 0 .
Moreover, the sentences Υ 0 , Υ 1 Υ 2 ... are all ∆ 0 formulae which satisfy Lemma 1's hypothesis. Therefore by applying n iterations of Lemma 1's Part-ii formalism, it easily follows that Υ n 's proof will have a length proportional to the sums of the lengths for the proofs of the theorems Φ 0 , Φ 1 , Φ 2 , ...Φ n . In other words, its length is proportional to:
Hence, Equation (30) implies the validity of Lemma 2 when we define the constant d to equal c + 1. 2 Definition 7 . Let Θ denote some Π 1 sentence. For notational simplicity, let us assume
..x k ) and that none of the free variable appearing in φ include v 1 , v 2 , ...v n Then Local(n, Θ) will be informally defined to be a ∆ 0 sentence asserting the statement:
We have called the above an "informal definition" of Local(n, Θ) because it is not technically a ∆ 0 sentence (when it uses a term of the type " 2 2 n "). The formal logically precise ∆ 0 definition for Local(n, Θ), using Equation (28)'s Υ n notation, is given below. (Note that the variable v n in Equation (31) represents the quantity 2 2 n . However unlike " 2 2 n " itself, v n 's implicit representation of this quantity is permitted to appear in a ∆ 0 formula !!! )
To appreciate the meaning of Equation (31), it should be noted that Υ n , (defined by Equation (28) ) has an identical structure as (31) -except that Equation (31) contains an added square bracket expression in its third line.
Lemma 3 Suppose a proof of the Π 1 sentence Θ has a length of L (from either the T-1 or T-2 axiomization for IΣ 0 ). Then for some fixed constant d, the proof of Local(n, Θ) will
Proof Sketch. Our proof of Lemma 3 will use the fact that the sentence Local(n, Θ) has an identical structure as Υ n , except that Equation (31)'s definition of Local(n, Θ) contains an additional square bracket expression in its third line. More precisely in a context where Θ has a proof of length L, this implies that " Υ n ⇒ Local(n, Θ) " has a proof whose length is bounded by O( L + n Log n ) (see footnote 6 ).
Moreover, Υ n falls under the scope of Lemma 1's paradigm (because it is a ∆ 0 formula which will satisfy Lemma 1's Tableaux ∆ 0 Compression property.) Also, Lemma 2 had indicated that for some fixed constant d ≥ 2, the sentence Υ n has a proof with length O(n d ).
Thus, we may again apply the combination of Definition 4 and Part ii of Lemma 1 to finish our proof. They imply that Local(n, Θ)'s proof-length is proportional to the sum of the lengths of the proofs for Υ n and for " Υ n ⇒ Local(n, Θ) ". Hence, O( L + n d ) bounds the length of its proof. 2 Theorem 3 . (Unlike our prior paper [40] whose Section 6 applied only to IΣ 0 's T-1 axiomization, this theorem will apply to both the T-1 or T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 ) Let Θ again denote a Π 1 sentence, and suppose that it has a semantic tableaux proof of length L from T-i. Also for some sentence Γ, suppose that there exists a semantic tableaux proof of length J from T-i of the theorem " Local(n, Θ) → Γ " Then for some fixed constant d, there will exist a semantic tableaux proof of Γ from T-i whose length is bounded by
Proof.
Since Θ has a proof of length L from T-i, Lemma 3 indicates Local(n, Θ)
will certainly have a proof of length O( L + n d ) from T-i, for some fixed constant d.
Also, the hypothesis of Theorem 3 stated that there was a proof of length J from T-i of the theorem " Local(n, Θ) → Γ " . Applying Lemma 1 to these last two upper bounds on proof lengths, we obtain that Γ has a semantic tableaux proof whose length is no greater
Theorem 3 is clearly a straightforward consequence of Lemmas 1 -3 combined with Definition 7's Local(N, Θ) formalism. Nevertheless, it is significant because it allows us to almost (not quite) simulate a Gentzen-style deductive cut rule for Π 1 sentences under either the T-1 or T-2 encodings of IΣ 0 .
The IΣ 0 Version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem
This section will explain how Passive Induction enables one to prove that both the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations of IΣ 0 satisfy the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. (Aside from producing a simpler proof methodology than had appeared in our earlier paper [40] , the proof in this section is significant because [40] 's theorem technically discussed only the properties of T-1.) It is useful to begin our discussion by reviewing why the question about the properties of IΣ 0 , raised by Paris and Wilkie in [23] , has challenged researchers for the last 25 years.
Let ω 1 (x) denote the usual function operator that maps the integer x onto the quantity
. Also for a fixed integer K, let ω K 1 (x) denote the functional operation that maps x onto the number ω 1 ( ω 1 ( ω 1 ( .... ω 1 ( x)))) -where there are here K iterations of the operation ω 1 .
In this context it is well known that most axiom systems α have the property that: * If p is a proof of the theorem T from α, then a proof from α that "p proves T from α " will assuredly have a Gödel number less that ω K 1 (p), for some fixed constant K .
The proof that many axiom systems satisfy the Second Incompleteness Theorem often involves some sub-step, where the concerned system is shown to satisfy the condition * .
One complicated aspect of IΣ 0 is that it does not recognize the operation of ω 1 (and therefore also ω K 1 as a "total function"). Thus, IΣ 0 cannot prove:
Nevertheless despite the fact that IΣ 0 cannot prove (32), Wilkie-Paris [37] did show that the Second Incompleteness Theorem held in a very strong sense for IΣ 0 . (They demonstrated IΣ 0 +Exp is unable to prove the Hilbert-consistency of a system as weak as Q. )
The proof of this result by Wilkie-Paris used at least a remote analog of Equation (32) Our solution to this problem is based upon using Definition 7's Local(n, Θ) construct to fill in the missing gaps. For an arbitrary integer n and for an arbitrary Π 1 sentence Θ , the ∆ 0 sentence Local(n, Θ) will state that Θ is valid for integers as large as 2 2 n . The point is that double exponentiation is a much faster growing function than ω 1 . It will be roughly what will be needed for producing our generalization of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
For the sake of clarity, IΣ 0 certainly cannot prove that ω 1 or any faster growing function is total in a global sense. However when the axiom system IΣ 0 reasons about its own metalogical powers, it will know that for a fixed integer n, the sentence "Local(n, Θ)" will certainly formalize a very rapid growth among integers within its own local and fixed domain. 
Henceforth, the symbol Ψ will denote the Gödel number of Ψ (as formally defined by Appendix A). Also, Ψ will denote the canonical binary representation of Ψ .
Definition 9 . The length (or perhaps one should say "bit-length") of a proof p is represented by the quantity Log 2 (p) when p is written in a binary notation. An often followed notation convention is that |p| denotes Log 2 (p). We shall follow this notation convention in the remainder of this paper.
Definition 10 . Let i = 1 or 2 . Throughout this paper, the symbol SemPrf i (t, p) will denote that p is a semantic tableaux proof of the theorem t from the T-i axiomization of IΣ 0 .
(When we speak of a theorem t possessing a "semantic tableaux proof", we will be referring to this notion, rather than to Definition 2's special artificial concept of a SemPrf such that q 's size is governed by the inequality of:
Lemma
Informal Justification:
Lemma 4 is one of those propositions whose proof is trivial, although somewhat tedious. This is because its formal proof employs a rather lengthy coding argument. We will therefore provide only an intuitive justification of Lemma 4.
The underlying intuition is that Lemma 4 permits one to load any finite number of Π 1 clauses into 0's formal definition, as long as all these clauses are provable from IΣ 0 . (This is why Section 2's starting choice of a particular encoding of Q is mostly unimportant, since we can add other clauses later into 0's formal definition.) Thus loaded into 0 will certainly be the associative, commutative and distributive principles for addition and multiplication.
We can even insert axioms declaring that multiplication and squaring are total functions, provided that they are encoded as Π 1 sentences (rather than in their more abbreviated and conventional Π 2 formats). By this we mean, the formalized Π 1 encodings of these two assertions should resemble the Equations (34) and (35) (whose bound on z's size causes these sentences to be Π 1 statements).
∀x ∀y ∃z ≤ x * y x · y = z (34) The point is that if we add enough sentences to 0 's defining structure, it is easy to establish that if p is an initial proof of some Π 1 theorem Ψ , then Local(p, 0) will be rich enough so that its union with the T-i axiom system supports a second proof q, verifying that "p is a formal proof " and satisfying Equation (33)'s inequality. The underlying intuition as to why Equation (33) can be satisfied is that nearly all axiom systems can accompany an initial proof p with a second proof q that verifies " p encodes a proof " and simultaneously satisfies
(for some fixed constant K ). Our task is actually much easier than this objective because we need merely verify that q satisfies the more relaxed upper bound of
] . Thus, it is quite easy to at least intuitively appreciate why Lemma 4 must be valid. 2
Remark 2 For the sake of brevity, the proof-sketch (above) had not provided a formal description of 0's required set of Π 1 sentences. However, it is actually easy to provide two additional explanations as to why it is actually quite easy to construct 0. They are given below:
1. It can be formally proven that Equation (33)'s inequality " q ≤ O( 2
) " is a sharp over-shoot. That is, one can actually construct a sentence 0 that will force q to satisfy the much tighter constraint of q ≤ O( 2 √ p ) . The reason that we had decided to work with Equation (33)'s more relaxed inequality is merely that it makes it easier to accomplish our main goals and purposes. This is because Equation (33) is such a whopping large inequality and over-shoot that it is trivially obvious that an adequately long list of Π 1 sentences, inserted into 0 's definition, will make this inequality hold.
2. Moreover from a technical standpoint, we do not actually formally need Equation (33) (33) is that the underlying diagonalization machinery of Theorem 2 is quite broadly encompassing. Thus, if one simply adjusts the exponent K in this theorem to equal the length of the tower of powers of 2, then it will be suitable for justifying the IΣ 0 incompleteness theorem, which shall be the final result of this article.
Hence, the point of Items 1 and 2 is that the reader should truthfully not pay too much attention to the details of Equation (33)'s inequality of " q ≤ O( 2
) ". This is because our formalism, based on applying the machineries of Theorems 1 and 2, easily has access to enough degrees of freedom for an entire family of alternative inequalities to be available, if they were needed.
Definition 12 . Let us recall that Benett's dissertation [6] had established that the relation " y =Log(x) " had a ∆ 0 graph, thereby implying that so does automatically " w =LogLog(z) " have a ∆ 0 graph. Using this graph's ∆ 0 notation, a Π 1 sentence 0 * will be said to satisfy the Trivial Exponentiation Property iff it satisfies the following two conditions:
A. 0 * is provable from the axiom system IΣ 0 . 
Thus, Lemma 2 has already enabled our current proof to be almost done. One Π 1 clause that needs to be inserted into 0 * 's sentence is the statement that: " ∀ x LogLog(x 2 ) = LogLog(x)+ 1 . (Since the j variables in Υ j have the property that v i = (v i−1 ) 2 , this equality implies the validity of Equation (37)'s identity.) There is some minor additional work for a formal proof to verify (internally within itself) that the canonical binary term " j " in Equation Subst(g, h) = The integer g is an encoding of a formula, and h encodes a sentence identical to g, except that all free variables in g are replaced with terms using Definition 8's "canonical encoding notation" for defining g's value.
(This means that all the free variables in g will be replaced by the term " g "
.)
A Π 1 sentence 0 * * will satisfy the Trivial Substitution Property iff the following two conditions hold:
A. 0 * * is provable from the axiom system IΣ 0 .
B. Let g and h denote a pair of integers satisfying the condition Subst(g, h) . Then for some fixed integer d, the ∆ 0 sentence Local( h , 0 * * ) will support an O( h d ) length proof of the statement "Subst( g , h ) ", as well as of the statement that h is the unique integer solution for this "Subst" predicate.
Lemma 6 There exists a Π 1 sentence 0 * * that satisfies Definition 13's Trivial Substitution Property.
Proof. Trivial and similar in overall structure to the proofs for Lemmas 4 and 5. (whose value is independent of p ). More formally, this proof q will satisfy the condition:
Proof: Lemma 7 is essentially a routine consequence of the combination of Lemmas 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6. We will sketch its proof in substantial detail because it is very central for proving our two main theorems.
Let β i denote an axiom system that is the union of the axiom system α i with the added sentence Υ p (from Definition 6). In a context where q 1 is a proof of Υ p from α i and q 2 is a proof of ¬ D 2 ( i ) from β i , Part-iii of Lemma 1 implies our proof q can be given a bit-length whose magnitude is proportional to the sum of the lengths of the two proofs 
it can be endowed with a proof-tree whose top portion will consist of the following 5 parts:
1. The root of the proof of ¬ D 2 ( i ) will contain the usual starting contradiction assumption of ¬ ¬ D 2 ( i ) . Applying Definition 1's Rule 2 (i.e. ¬ elimination), the child of this root sentence will then be the simple sentence of:
2. Below Equation (39)'s node will be stored β i 's axiom of Υ p .
3. A sequence of p+1 iterations of Definition 1's bounded-existential quantifier elimination rule will then follow. (This is Definition 1's reduction rule 6.) Its i−th iteration will eliminate the i-th existential quantified variable v i from Υ p and replace it with a parameter U i (that represents the number of 2 2 i ).
The Definitions 2 and 3 of Section 2 had defined D K (α) and SemPrf
K α (x, y, z). Item 1 of our current construction also has noted that the child of the proof-tree's root is the sentence D 2 (i). Unpacking this formal notation into its component parts, the Gödel diagonalization sentence D 2 (i) can thus be formally written as:
in a context where N was the Gödel number of
Let M be the Gödel number of Equation (40)'s sentence. Then the next step of our semantic tableaux proof will apply three instances of Definition 1's ∀ Elimination Rule to Equation (40)'s stored node. It will replace the variables y, z and h with the terms of p , U p and M , as shown below:
5. Finally by applying Definition 1's three elimination rules for the ⇒ , ¬ and ∨ connectives to (42)'s stored node, three separate branches of the proof-tree will be generated descending from the node (42) . The terminating sentences in these three branches will be:
The significance of the sentences stored in the nodes (43) - (45) is that the Lemmas 4 -6 had indicated how closed subtrees can be inserted underneath these three nodes whose bit-lengths, at a minimum, satisfy the formal upper bound O( 2
(This is because one can think of the nodes (43) - (45) 
Proof. Some notation will be needed to set up Theorem 4's proof. In a context of proofs that employ the T-i axiomizations for IΣ 0 , let
Note that Local( p , D 2 (i) ) is a ∆ 0 sentence. The combination of Items (1) and (2) with Part-ii of Lemma 1 therefore implies we can construct a proof q of 0=1 from IΣ 0 's T-i axiomization that satisfies the inequality:
Likewise because Local( p , Trivial-M ) is a ∆ 0 sentence, a second application of Part-ii of Lemma 1 implies that we can construct q 2 so that it satisfies
Thus by combining the results from Equations (47) and (48), it follows that q can be constructed so that it satisfies:
Thus to calculate a bound on |q|'s size, we need to estimate the lengths for q 1 , q 3 and q 4 . This is done below:
a. Since the hypothesis of Theorem 4 indicated that p was a proof of D 2 (i) , we may apply Lemma 3's formalism to construct a proof q 1 that satisfies (50)'s inequality:
b. It was already established by Corollary 1 that Trivial-M is provable from IΣ 0 . Therefore, let r denote such a proof of Trivial-M. In this context, we can apply Lemma 3 to construct a proof q 3 that satisfies the inequality:
Moreover, our O-notation in Equation (51) is intended to describe the properties of a constant c whose value is independent of quantities p and d. Since the proof r is a fixed constant whose structure does not depend in any manner upon p and d, we may therefore absorb it into the O-notation's constant c and thus rewrite this equation in the following simpler form: 
from T-i because these two proofs will have lengths that differ obviously by no more than an inconsequentially small number of additional lines. (see the footnote 7 for a detailed justification of this last point).
Thus by substituting these three upper bounds on the lengths of q 1 , q 2 and q 4 's proofs into Equation (49), one verifies the inequality in Equation (46) 
.
Proof: Same as Theorem 4's proof. 2
Remark 3. The next three propositions in this paper will extend the results of Corollary 2 and Theorem 4 to show that the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness
Theorem is valid for both the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 . The same result will also apply to a Herbrandized version of IΣ 0 's Incompleteness Theorem. However, it is impractical to cover both topics in one paper. Instead of treating the topic of Herbrandization formally, we have inserted an abbreviated Appendix E into this paper that explains the underlying intuition as to why Herbrand deduction behaves so very similarly to semantic tableaux deduction. (The abbreviated discussion in Appendix E is too brief to be a formal proof. Thus, it may be very beneficial for some other author to compose a more formal proof about this subject.) Since Appendix E assumes that the reader has some prior experience with Herbrand deduction 7 The claim made by the footnoted sentence is actually quite trivial to verify. A proof from T-i of
will obviously have the same asymptotic length as a proof from the union of T-i with the added axiom of " Local( p , Trivial-M ) " of the theorem " Local( p , D 2 (i) ) ⇒ 0 = 1 ". Moreover from the definition of the latter sentence, it is easy to confirm that the latter's proof will exceed the asymptotic length of the proof of ¬ D systems, some readers may prefer to omit this appendix during their first pass through this article.
Lemma 8 Let α denote any axiom system that includes all the formal axioms of either T-1 or T-2. Then there will exist two constants, K and M , such that α can prove the following statement about itself:
Proof. The entire proof of Theorem 4 and its Corollary 2 can be carried out formally within the domain of IΣ 0 . Therefore, the axiom system α mentioned in Lemma 8's hypothesis can formalize these proofs. This implies that α can also prove Equation (54) 
Proof.
If α could prove the bold-face sentence mentioned in Theorem 5 then it would satisfy the first of the three conditions that Theorem 2 had indicated would make it automatically inconsistent (i.e. Theorem 2's condition A). Moreover, it is obvious that α can also prove Theorem 2's condition (B) (simply because α is an extension of the axiom system IΣ 0 ). Furthermore, Lemma 8 showed that α also could prove Theorem 2's third required condition (called C* ). Hence if α proves a theorem asserting its own semantic tableaux consistency, then Theorem 2 will imply α is inconsistent. 2
Theorem 6 Every consistent extension of either the T-1 or T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 is unable to prove a theorem asserting its own semantic tableaux consistency.
Proof. An immediate consequence of Theorem 5 because Theorem 6 is a logically equivalent statement, simply rewritten in a contrapositive form. 2
Finally, we wish to invite the reader to examine some of our other published papers [39, 42, 43, 44, 45] about this subject. These papers had noted that some formal systems are able 8 Since by definition |q| = Log 2 (q), Equation (53) easily implies that q < 2 2 p when q > M for some fixed constant M . Thus, Equation (54)'s statement follows when one thinks of its variables y and x as corresponding to p and q from Equation (53) and when one sets K = 2 and makes M sufficiently large.
to retain an ability to at least partially corroborate their own consistency in a context where they omit the axiom that multiplication is a total function. (One of these systems is even able to prove the theorem that multiplication is a total function, in a context where [45] 's main result would collapse entirely if such a statement about multiplication's totality property was merely changed from being a theorem into becoming an axiom. In particular, [45] Leszek Ko lodziejczyk during their 3-way conversations in Warsaw. I want to emphasize that those questions played a major role in stimulating me to write this current paper, as well as to write the companion paper [45] (which outlines an unusual paradigm where the Second Incompleteness Theorem can be partially evaded under a third axiomization for IΣ 0 ).
I also thank the anonymous referee for several very useful suggestions, including the suggestion that Appendix C be added to this article.
Appendix A: Summary of Gödel Encoding Method
This appendix describes our formal method for encoding semantic tableaux proofs as Gödel numbers. Our encoding scheme will be roughly analogous to the "natural B-adic" encoding methods of Hájek-Pudlák [13] and Wilkie-Paris [37] -insofar as the number of utilized bits to encode a semantic object will be approximately proportional to the length of such an expression written by hand. This appendix will be somewhat unnecessary because a reader should be able to appreciate the gist of our article without examining a description of our Gödel encoding method. However in a context where Sections 2-4 often allude to the " Gödel encoding" of a syntactic object, it is clearly helpful to summarize our encoding method.
Our scheme for encoding a semantic tableaux proof will use the following 20 language symbols:
1. The standard connective symbols of ∧, ∨, ¬, ⇒, ∀ and ∃.
Two pairs of left and two right parenthesis symbols denoted as: ( , ) ( and ) .
3. Three symbols to represent the special constants of "0", "1" and "2".
4. Three function symbols for representing the operations of addition, multiplication and integer-successor.
5. The relation symbols of " = " and " ≤ ".
6. The symbolV for designating the presence of a basic variable v in a logical sentence.
7. The symbolÛ for designating the presence of a parameter constant u in a logical sentence (which is produced by Definition 1's deduction rules 5 and 6 for eliminating existential quantifiers).
Define a byte to be an unit consisting of six bits. We will think of a proof as either comprising a sequence of bytes (or being an integer written in base 64). Each of the 20 symbols (above) will be given some unique 6-bit code, ranging between 32 and 51. Our method for representing the presence of the i-th variable v i will be to encode it is as a string of log 32 (i + 1) + 1 bytes, where the first byte is the "V " symbol and the remaining bytes encode i as a base-32 number, with the convention that the lead bit in each byte's 6-bit sequence is "0". The same convention will be used to denote the presence of the i-th parameter u i except its first byte will be the "Û " symbol.
Our notation has employed two types of parenthesis symbols because the first pair of parenthesis symbols will have their usual meaning in punctuating a mathematical sentence, whereas the latter pair of symbols ( and ) will separate the individual sentences in a Semantic Tableaux proof tree. For example, consider a tree which stores 1) the sentence ψ 1 as its root, 2) the sentences ψ 2 and ψ 3 as the root's children, and 3) ψ 4 as the child of ψ 3 .
There are several possible notation conventions for using the ( and ) symbols to encode a Semantic Proof tree. Our encoding convention will be that ψ i is an "ancestor" of ψ j if and only if the range beginning with the parenthesis to ψ i 's immediate left and continuing to the matching right parenthesis includes ψ j . The example of our 4-node proof tree would thus be encoded as:
This byte-styled encoding method is approximately analogous to what Wilkie-Paris [37] have called a natural B-adic encoding or a similar counterpart in the Hájek-Pudlák textbook [13] . Such compressed encodings are considered to be more meaningful and efficient than an uncompressed encoding method, using say a Prime Number decomposition scheme [20] (because the latter has an unnecessarily long bit-length). All our theorems will therefore employ such compressed encoding methods.
Appendix B: An Easy Extension of [40]'s Formalism
This appendix employs the notation from Section 2. Thus, Q 0 will denote an axiomization of Q that uses the Π 1 axioms from Equations (9) - (16) . Also, Q 1 will again denote a system that is begotten by taking the union of Q 0 with Equation (56)'s axiom, and Q 2 will represent the union of Q 0 with the Equations (56) and (57).
∀x ∀y ∃z x * y = z (56)
A key point is that although Equations (56) and (57) ∀x ∀y ∃z ≤ x * y x * y = z (58)
One of the results in [40] was that there existed two Π 1 sentences, called V and V * , such that:
1. No consistent α ⊃ Q 1 + V can prove a theorem affirming its own semantic tableaux consistency, 2. No consistent α ⊃ Q 2 +V * can prove a theorem affirming its own Herbrand consistency. Now let W denote the conjunction of the Π 1 sentences of V and V * with the sentences in Equations (58) and (59).
follows that no consistent α ⊃ Q 0 +W can prove a theorem affirming either its own semantic tableaux consistency or its own Herbrand consistency.
The latter observation is significant because W is a Π 1 sentence (similar to V and V * ).
Section 6 of [40] had shown that Π 1 sentences have a very special property, which its Definition The point is that W is also a Π 1 theorem of IΣ 0 . (Hence, it also falls under the scope of the invariant * . ) Therefore, one can certainly apply Section 6's full formalism also to it. Thus using the same reasoning as before (see footnote 9 ), one obtains that the Type-1-0 axiomization for IΣ 0 also satisfies the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem.
Hence, if one wishes to meticulously separate the definitions of IΣ 0 (depending upon whether they use Q 0 's instead of Q 1 's definition of Q), then both formalisms will have essentially identical properties. In particular, if one simply replaces the Π 1 sentence V in Section 6 of [40] with the Π 1 sentence of W , then the remainder of [40] 's proof of IΣ 0 's semantic tableaux incompleteness property for its Type-1-1 axiomizations generalizes readily for Type-1-0.
Appendix C
Our main proof that the Types 2-0, 2-1 and 2-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 do satisfy the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem will appear in Section 4 of this article.
This proof will employ Section 3's notion of passive induction as a helpful intermediate step.
It is also possible to devise a different type of proof of this fact using the earlier methodologies from [40] . We will sketch such a proof very briefly in this appendix. Our discussion will presuppose that the reader possesses a detailed knowledge of our article [40] . If a reader has not yet examined [40] , he will find the new proof in Sections 2-4 to be easier to comprehend than the sharply abbreviated discussion in this appendix.
The Definition 6.1 from [40] had introduced the notion of an axiom system α possessing an Hyper-Constructive Semantic Proof of the theorem Υ . This construct had meant that a sentence " Θ Υ " existed such that 1. α contains the formal axiom " Θ Υ ⇒ Υ ", and 2. the sentence Θ Υ is a theorem of α.
We will also call " Θ Υ " the Hyper-Constructed Representative of Υ.
Let us say a Π 1 sentence Υ is y-focused iff it can be written in the form ∀ y φ(y) where φ(y) is a ∆ 0 formula. Although Section 6 of [40] did not explicitly deal with the detailed distinction between the Type "1-0" "1-1" and "1-2" constructs, it can be viewed as implying that hyper-connectivity is very useful for analyzing each of these three Type-1 axiomization for IΣ 0 (see footnote 10 ). This is because for each of the cases where j equals 0, 1 or 2, the Type-1-j axiomization for IΣ 0 will satisfy the following two conditions for every y−focused
a. The Type-1-j axiomization for IΣ 0 will assure that each of its Π 1 theorems Υ will have a Hyper-Constructed Representative, denoted as Θ Υ and satisfying the conditions (1) and (2) The remainder of this appendix will explain how an analogous construction can be applied to the Type-2-1 and Type-2-0 axiomizations for IΣ 0 . (We do not discuss the Type-2-2 axiomization explicitly in this appendix because it is plainly simpler than the Type 2-1 case.)
The proof for each of these cases will be somewhat more complicated than the Type-1 proofs because a precise analog of Hyper-Constructivity will be simply unavailable (since an analog Proof Sketch. The definition of a semantic tableaux proof can be found in the Fitting's and Smullyan's textbooks [11, 29] , as well as in Definition 1 of Section 2. Our proof of Fact 1 will assume the reader is familiar with at least one of these definitions of a semantic tableaux proof. Also, we will use the symbolφ(y) as a convenient abbreviation for the predicate of ¬ ¬ φ(y) . (The footnote 11 explains howφ(y) has different properties from φ(y) although these two predicates are logically equivalent.)
A semantic tableaux proof of Ψ will begin by storing ¬ Ψ in its root. The definition of a semantic tableaux proof allows one to store an axiom in any non-root node of this proof.
The child of our root will thus store Equation (2)'s Type-2 induction scheme axiom for the predicateφ(y) . Its grandchild will store Equation (61) 
We will next apply a second instance of the ∀ elimination rule to replace the variable z with the term t in Equation (61). Then the child of Equation (61) will be:
A subsequent application of the semantic tableaux ⇒ elimination rule will produce the following resultant pair of sibling nodes.
The remainder of our semantic proof of Ψ will possess a structure similar to its analogs in Section 6 of [40] . Thus a closed subtree with O( N ) sentences can be placed below Equation (63)'s sentence because this subtree will consist of essentially two copies of Υ 's proof. Similarly because ¬ Ψ is an ancestor of (64)'s sentence, we may insert roughly a copy of Equation (60)'s proof below Equation (64)'s sentence. This proof will consist of M nodes.
Hence the full proof of Ψ will consist of no more than O( N + M ) sentences. 2 Proof Sketch: Let us recall that the Type-2-1 axiomization for IΣ 0 contains Equation (65) as an axiom.
∀x ∀y ∃z x * y = z (65)
Using techniques from our article [40] , we may construct a sub-fragment of a semantic tableaux proof tree consisting of O(K) sentences (within a straightline path) establishing the existence of a sequence of parameters u 0 , u 1 , u 2 , ... u K such that u 0 = 2 and u i+1 = u i * u i . Hence this fragment of our proof-tree will consist of K applications of Equation (65)'s axiom, used to establish the following identity:
Also, the combination of Conditions (1) and (2) Thus, the remainder of the justification that the Type-2-1 axiomization for IΣ 0 satisfies the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem is similar to its analog in Section 6 of our prior paper [40] .
We will now turn our attention to the somewhat harder Type-2-0 axiomization of IΣ 0 .
Unlike the Type-2-1 system, it does not contain Equation (65) as an axiom. Therefore it, needs a slightly more complicated argument to establish that its analog of Fact 2 is true. The formalisms of Definition 16 and Fact 3 will enable us to do this.
.. Ψ K denote a sequence of sentences that appears within a semantic tableaux proof tree T that employs the axiom system α. A Semantic Tableaux
Fragment supporting this set of sentences will be defined to be a sub-tree S within the proof-tree T that meets the following three conditions 1. The root of S is some axiom of α.
2. One branch of S , called its Major Branch, will contain each of the sentences of
3. All the other branches of S will satisfy the usual semantic tableaux requirement that they contain a pair of contradictory sentences.
Clarifying Comment:
We call the reader's attention to the fact that Definition 16
does not require the "major branch" to contain a pair of contradicting sentences physically stored within the sub-tree S . (It merely requires that all the other branches of S have this property. The intuitive reason that the major branch is not required to contain a pair of contradictory sentences is that S will be embedded inside a larger proof tree T where every branch does indeed end with a contradiction.)
Fact 3 Let u 0 be another way of writing the named constant of "2" (which was defined by the axiom in Equation (9)). Let u 1 , u 2 , ... u K denote K parameters that are defined by Equation (67)'s identity (which causes u i = 2 2 i ).
.. Ψ K denote the versions of Equation (67) where i denotes 1 , 2 , ... K .
Then for some fixed constant L (whose value is independent of K ), it is always possible under the axiom system T-2 to construct a semantic tableaux fragment which consist of no more than L·K nodes and whose major branch includes all the sentences of
Proof Sketch. We will use the principle of induction to prove Fact 3. Thus, we shall assume that there is available a length L · (K − 1) semantic tableaux fragment S K−1
representing the sentences Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 , ... Ψ K−1 . We shall extend this part of our semantic tableaux proof to construct a length L · K semantic tableaux fragment S K representing the
In our discussion, Ξ will denote the node at the bottom of S K−1 's major branch, and φ * (y) will denote the following somewhat awkward-looking ∆ 0 formula:
All the additional nodes of the subtree S K will be inserted directly below Ξ . The first two of these nodes will consist of the Type-2 induction axiom for the formula φ * (y) and the formula that results from the preceding when the ∀ x quantifier is eliminated. The latter is illustrated below. (It is structured identically to the earlier Equation (61) except that we are now using φ * (y) rather thanφ(y) as the base predicate.)
We will now apply a second instance of the ∀ elimination rule to replace the variable z with the term u K−1 in Equation (69). Then the child of Equation (69) will be:
A subsequent application of the semantic tableaux ⇒ elimination rule will produce the following pair of sibling nodes:
We will next apply to the ∀ Elimination rule to the node (72) so that y is replaced by the new parameter u K−1 and thus obtain the sentence:
Applying the ⇒ elimination rule to the node (73), we then obtain the following pair of two sibling nodes:
Our construction of S K is now essentially done. This is because Equation (68)'s definition of φ * (together with the fact that a node storing the sentence Ψ K−1 is an ancestor of (75)'s node) trivially implies that one can develop a subtree that descends from Equation (75)'s sentence and whose every branch ends with either the sentence Ψ K or with a pair of contradicting sentences. Moreover from Equation (68)'s definition for φ * , it is also obvious that one can insert subtrees below the two nodes storing Equations (71) and (74) that contain the required contradictions for closing these branches of the proof tree. Since it is easy to check that this construction assures that the difference between the number of sentences stored in S K−1 and S K is a fixed constant L (whose value is independent of K ), our proof of Fact 3 is done.
2
On the Significance of Fact 3:
The interesting aspect of Fact 3 is that it shows that the Type-2-1 and Type-2-0 axiomizations of IΣ 0 have similar properties, despite the fact that the latter does not contain Equation (65)'s axiom that multiplication is a total function. This is because Fact 3 showed that even when this axiom is absent, there still will exist a semantic tableaux fragment with O(K) nodes establishing the existence of the quantity 2 2 K ,
represented by the parameter symbol u K . (The only difference is that the constant hidden in the O-notation is larger in the latter case, i.e. its O-notation uses a larger constant Lwhose value once again does not depend on K.)
As a result of this similarity, our proof that the Type-2-1 axiomization of IΣ 0 satisfies the semantic tableaux version of the Second Incompleteness version generalizes easily also for its Type-2-0 axiomization. We will not provide more details about this topic here because an alternate and seemingly simpler proof of the same result will appear in Sections 3 and 4, using the notion of a passive induction proof as a simplifying step. The reason that we had briefly sketched an alternate type of proof in this appendix is that it connects more closely to the type of methodologies that were used in our earlier paper [40] . In the context of Definition 6's sentence Υ i , Lemma 2's proof had formally defined Φ i to be the sentence:
Moreover, Lemma 2's proof required that we establish the following invariant be true:
( + ) For some fixed constant c, the sentence Φ i will have a proof with an O( i c ) length from either the T-1 or T-2 axiomization for IΣ 0 .
The formal proof of Equation (76) will consist of the following 5 steps:
1. The root of Φ i 's proof will contain the usual starting contradiction assumption that its negation is true. Then applying Part 2-c of Definition 1's ¬ elimination rule, Equation
(77) will represent the root's child.
A further application of the ∧ elimination rule will produce a straight-line path containing the two sentences of:
2. The application of i iterations of Definition 1's ∃ elimination rule (together with i + 1 iterations of Definition 1's ∧ elimination rule) to Equation (78)'s sentence will create i − 1 new parameters called U 0 , U 1 , U 2 ...U i−1 so that a new node on this straight-line path (after simplification) shall store the sentence
3. The application of i + 1 cycles of Definition 1's ¬ elimination rule to Equation (79)'s sentence will cause another new node on this straight-line path to store the sentence:
4. The fourth step of our proof will apply i + 1 iterations of Definition 1's rule for eliminating bounded universal quantifiers to the node that stores Equation (81)'s sentence.
For j ≤ i − 1 , the variable v j will be replaced by the parameter U j , and Equation (82)'s final variable of v i will be replaced by the term of U i−1 * U i−1 . The resulting node in our straight-line path will then be:
5. The last part of our proof tree is based on the observation that the sentences stored in Equations (80) and (82) lie in a straight-line path and contradict each other. The formal reason that they contradict each other is because Equation (80) implies that each parameter U j equals 2 2 j -whereas the " ¬ " symbol in the second line of Equation (82) indicates that this cannot be the case. Thus on account of this contradiction, it is possible to develop a further proof subtree that descends from the sentences storing these two nodes, all of whose branches are "closed".
We will not provide further details concerning the construction of Equation (76)'s proof because its overall structure should be evident from the above 5-step description. The fundamental point is that if one works out the details of constructing Step 5's proof tree, then (with a little care) one can assure it will have an O( i c ) length, for some fixed constant c as required by the statement + this appendix has sought to prove.
Appendix E
The abbreviated discussion in this appendix will assume that the reader has already seen a formal definition of Herbrand Deduction, in for example [1, 13, 16] . Roughly speaking a
Herbrand proof that an axiom system α is inconsistent consists of a 4-step process that 1) first writes α's axioms in their prenex normal forms, 2) next transforms these axioms into Skolemized statements, 3) then generates a finite number of instances of these axioms, where each instance is produced by replacing all the Skolemized statement's free variables (from universal quantifier declarations) with terms built from the combination of the Skolem functions and of the language's initial built-in functions, and 4) finally develops a propositional calculus style proof that these finite set of instances are unsatisfiable (i.e. that they produce a proof of " ⊥ "). An interesting facet of Herbrand Deduction is that the set of available Skolem functions makes an enormous difference in the efficiency (or proof length) of such a construction.
For instance, let S(x) denote the Skolemized operation of squaring the integer x. Since S(x) = x * x, it is obvious that multiplication has the logical capacity to simulate a Herbrand function that performs the squaring operation. However, it typically does such a simulation much less efficiently than the squaring operation.
Thus, if one starts with a constant c that represents the number 2 and wishes to write the number 2 2 n then this quantity could be represented quite efficiently by performing n iterations of the squaring function, (i.e. as formally in 2 2 n = S n (c) where S n denotes n iterations of S ). However in contrast, if only the Skolemized multiplication function symbol is available to write the number 2 2 n , then a very inefficient 2 n − 1 applications of the multiplication function are required to write the number 2 2 n (i.e. as in a product using the normalized multiplicative form of: 2 * 2 * 2 * ... * 2 ).
Since a major part of our proofs for Lemmas 2 -7 required calculating numbers of the form 2 2 n efficiently, we need some methodology to overcome the preceding paragraph's problem about inefficient uses of multiplication (see the footnote 12 for a clarification). The solution is to move away from the notion of Skolemized functions for constructing our Herbrand proof of the falsity sentence ⊥ and instead to use an "ascending sequence" of Skolemized constants. As we shall see, the latter can produce constructions as efficient as squaring (and much more efficient than a use of solely the multiplication Skolem function).
More Details about the Formal Nature of "Ascending Sequences" of Skolemized Constants: Four examples will help illustrate how Skolemized constants can very efficiently replace Skolemized functions. Consider the prenex normal sentence appearing in Equation (83). Since this sentence contains no universal quantifiers, it is natural to view each existentially quantified variable v i as being a place holder for a Skolemized constant.
(In other words, the "Skolemized function notation" is technically inappropriate for Equation Let us now explore the implications of such a treatment of Equation (85)'s bounded quantifiers. Consider the possibility that t i is defined as above and that φ(v 0 , v 1 , v 2 ... v n ) is the 12 In other words, our discussion is motivated by the fact that squaring is not an available operation under the T-1 and T-2 axiomizations for IΣ 0 . Thus, we need an alternate methodology to simulate its efficiency. This appendix will be essentially devoted to showing how we can solve this problem with an analog of Definition 6's sentence of Υ n .
sentence appearing in Equation (86). The latter observation is useful because it illustrates that we do not need an explicit use of Skolem functions, growing at least as fast as squaring, for an axiom system α to efficiently construct the quantity 2 2 n via a Skolemization system. Indeed, if α contains the sentence of Υ n as an axiom, then α can use this particular sentence's formalism to efficiently simulate the first n iterations of the operation of squaring. (This is because Υ n formalizes what we call an "ascending sequence of Skolemized constants". )
We are now ready to collect together the informal arguments given in this appendix to explain, at least intuitively, how the results in Sections 3 and 4 can be generalized from semantic tableaux deduction to Herbrand deduction. It firstly should be noted that the sentence Υ n is not an axiom of either of our two axiomizations for IΣ 0 , (called its T-1 and T-2 encodings). Therefore, some added work is certainly needed to explain how Υ n can be treated as essentially as a virtual axiom, instead.
The main point is that Υ n is a ∆ 0 sentence. Thus, it is permissible for it to formally appear as a passive-inductive subformula within the Type-1 and Type-2 induction axioms of Our discussion in this appendix was certainly informal. We felt this article would probably be too long if it sought to deal in depth with both semantic tableaux and Herbrand deduction.
However, we hope that at least our intuitive outline has adequately explained some of the underlying intuitions.
What we are trying to suggest in this appendix is that while a proof of the Herbrandized version of the IΣ 0 incompleteness theorem will be certainly quite interesting and very different from our semantic tableaux analysis, we would anticipate that there are some types of proofs of the Herbrandized version of this incompleteness theorem that partially resemble the analysis techniques used in Sections 3 and 4 for semantic tableaux deduction.
